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Decomposing the Humanities
Steven Connor
One of the things that anyone involved in the murky busi-ness of humanities scholarship comes to know, without knowing how, or perhaps without even knowing that they know it, is the 
difference between criticism and critique. It was necessary to internalize 
this understanding because it might be said that the decisive and defin-
ing shift that took place with the reorganization of the humanities from 
the 1980s onward around the various forms of theory was the shift from 
criticism to critique. Terry Eagleton once gently mocked a certain kind 
of literary criticism as the practice of inscribing “could do better” in the 
margins of literary texts, but that mode of criticism already seemed mist-
ily antiquarian when I entered my own life of intellectual crime under 
Terry’s witty tutelage at Wadham College in 1973. The thing known as 
criticism, or at least a certain ideal conception of it, was governed by 
the Arnoldian injunction to try to see the object as in itself it really is. 
Criticism required one to inhabit the text, to learn to see things in its 
own terms. There was a time, let us remind ourselves with amazement, 
when “criticism” might also have been known as “critical appreciation.” 
The alumni who studied English in Cambridge in the 1950s and 1960s 
recognize clearly enough in the pained letters they occasionally write 
to me that literary appreciation, now thought of as credulous and soft-
headed weakness, has given way to analysis in the service of deprecation. 
Critique, by contrast, was characterized by a kind of deliberated recoil 
from the voluptuous temptations represented by texts, the cultivation of 
an alert, no-flies-on-me vigilance about the acts of reading and interpre-
tation. Critique was underpinned by theory in a way that criticism never 
could be, because critique always both required and, more importantly 
in terms of thymotic satisfactions, reliably delivered the sense that the 
text had been outwitted. Critique allowed one to come at one’s object 
of analysis from some higher ground, or rather perhaps from some 
cunning subterranean passage, which enabled one to tunnel behind or 
underneath its presumptions, articulate its silences, to see it, in short, 
not as in itself it really was, but as it was unable to see itself. 
The growth of critique is not entirely due to the desire for dominion 
or for aristocratic immunity from guilt—or at least from gullibility. It is 
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surely also a response to the sense that the humanities need to account 
for themselves, whether to justify their continued funding or secure the 
self-esteem of their exponents. A humanities dedicated to the work of 
critique can seem, or at least feel itself to be, an altogether more earnest 
and self-denyingly austere affair than a humanities dedicated to footling 
frolics of mere appreciation. One of the signs of this purposiveness was 
and is the absence of a noun form for the one who practices critique. 
Where it was clear that somebody engaged in the act of criticism could 
be called a “critic,” it was not at all clear how one should refer to the 
person engaged in the work of critique. A critiquer? Critiquist? “Critical 
theorist” is the closest we have come. This invisibility or unsayability is 
odd, given that critique tended to be regarded as a much more system-
atic affair of disciplinary self-formation, requiring not just high levels of 
training but also unresting, out-of-hours zeal. I have no ready explanation 
to offer for this odd unnameability, unless it is that critique prefers to 
keep its deep psychic satisfactions unacknowledged.
The growth of an aggressive hermeneutics of suspicion made for a 
danger, that the flame of denunciation would burn through the entire 
canon of cultural objects. But this was defended against by the structur-
ally necessary discovery that texts, or the best ones, the ones that would 
survive torching by critique, were the ones that could be seen to be 
themselves engaged in the very same work of critique, of themselves or 
some other object. So the show-trials of the critical humanities turned 
into mass reprievals of those texts which actively cooperated with the 
work of their interrogators and coughed up the names and addresses 
of their co-conspirators.
Bruno Latour’s work has been for some considerable time propelled 
by a dissatisfaction with this work of critique. If there is one principle 
associated with the kind of work that Latour wants to encourage, though 
his addressees tend to be those in the social sciences rather than the hu-
manities, it is the abandonment of critique, in favor of more affirmative 
postures and actions. Latour can be generous in his appreciation of his 
intellectual heroes—Gabriel Tarde, William James, and A. N. Whitehead 
are the names that recur in his recent work—but there is none as heroic, 
none as appreciated, and none whose work anticipates and enables as 
much of Latour’s own, as Michel Serres. Latour’s appreciation of Serres 
depends upon the fact that he sees in him a philosopher who abjures 
critique. “A ‘critique’ philosopher sees his task as that of establishing a 
distance between beliefs on the one hand and knowledge on the other, 
or between ideologies and science, or between democracy and ter-
ror—just to take three avatars of the ‘Critique.’ To be taken in, that is 
the main worry of a critique philosopher. . . . The Critique work is that 
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of a reduction of the world into two packs, a little one that is sure and 
certain, the immense rest which is simply believed and in dire need of 
being criticized, founded, re-educated, straightened up.”1 
Latour praises Serres for not joining in this kind of bisecting, adver-
sarial game. Critique is an agonistic, even a martial affair, and holding 
back from critique is part of Serres’s oneiric sense of the vocation of 
philosophy, which he understands less as the love of knowledge than the 
knowledge of love. In the only conversation I have ever had with him, 
knowing of his interest in sport, I attempted some lamely matey banter 
about international rugby, with a teasing remark about the superior 
performance (at the time) of the English rugby team compared with the 
French. He replied with a shrug, accompanied by a “what-can-you-do?” 
half-smile, that gently but definitively declined to play the vulgarly ad-
versarial game to which I was trying to recruit him. I had been reproved 
and felt I had something to expiate, a pettiness. For Serres, intellectual 
life cannot be conducted in the mode of attack and defence. There is 
in fact a great deal more ferocity in Serres than one might expect, but 
what he is most ferociously is an intellectual noncombatant. One might 
go even further and say that Serres’s work gently and for the most part 
unaggressively, like the wise parent distracting the toddler from its im-
perious tantrum, encourages its reader to become less interested in the 
self-indulgent agonies associated with epistemology—what can we know 
for sure? How can we avoid being made fools of?
Latour returns repeatedly to Serres’s work for an example of how 
to do without the voluptuously austere pleasures of critique. In a later, 
oft-cited essay, Latour writes mockingly of the way in which the austere 
and aristocratic sense of distinction offered by the exercise of critique 
has become universally available. “Isn’t this fabulous? Isn’t it really worth 
going to graduate school to study critique? ‘Enter here, you poor folks. 
After arduous years of reading turgid prose, you will be always right, 
you will never be taken in any more; no one, no matter how powerful, 
will be able to accuse you of naiveté, that supreme sin, any longer?’”2 
And yet passages like this are an unmistakeable indication that Latour 
is as much driven by the libido of critique as anyone else. Time and 
again his work lays out the egregious errors of our own condition or 
our understanding of it that must be rinsed away by clear-eyed reflec-
tion. Latour’s signature text in this respect is We Have Never Been Modern, 
which seems to take vast and mischievous pleasure in dismantling the 
core assumption of social theory, economic thought, and anthropological 
inquiry that, whatever else we may be, we can be sure at least that we 
are modern, in the sense that we have somehow been propelled into a 
condition in which we must stand outside and opposed to merely natu-
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ral existence. To be sure, Latour is more inclined to encourage a sort 
of retoxification—the acknowledgement of complex, natural/cultural 
entanglements and confederations—than the detoxification of purify-
ing differentiations of culture and nature. But the impulse to expunge 
and escape from erroneous thinking is as strong in him as in anyone, 
not least in the stylish comedy of his polemic, comedy never being far 
away from cruelty.
One of the difficulties with the project of showing repeatedly and ever 
more definitively that we have never been modern is that one must start 
to wonder who precisely the people are who are supposed to inhabit 
this noncategory (or, rather, perhaps, not to inhabit it). The hyphenated 
not-modern people, those who wrongly assume they are modern, come 
closer and closer to the unhyphenated folk who are just not modern, 
or have never been thought to be so in the first place. In On the Modern 
Cult of the Factish Gods, Latour surprisingly adopts the term “Blacks” to 
refer to such unmodern people.3 And yet, this failure to make it as a 
hypothecated modern may be the very thing that marks you most de-
finitively as a modern (or White).
Latour has characterized the project announced in An Inquiry into 
Modes of Existence as an attempt to move away from the negative mode 
of his own earlier work, as sternly intimated in the title of his We Have 
Never Been Modern, in order to “at last be able to give a positive, rather 
than merely a negative, version of those who ‘have never been modern.’”4 
One wonders if there is not a memory in this characterization of his dif-
ficulty in finding a term to describe Serres’s philosophy: “I am struggling 
for a word that would best describe Michel Serres’ philosophy. ‘Positive’ 
would come to mind if Comte had not given this word a dubious poster-
ity.”5 An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence sets out to ask, if we have never 
been modern, what is is that we have been? It is for this reason that 
the book is subtitled An Anthropology of the Moderns. The Moderns must 
be taken to be those who take themselves (erroneously) to be modern. 
It is perhaps a little like the distinction between white noise and pink 
noise. Both of them are, and sound like, kinds of noise: but where white 
noise is a purely random distribution of frequencies, pink noise is a 
distribution of frequencies in which the power-frequency relationship 
aligns with human hearing. Pink noise is a homelier, fleshier, less noisy 
sort of noise. The way of being not-modern that Moderns, indeed “the 
Moderns,” exhibit, sounds reassuringly modern. 
One might say that, for Latour, what are ever more definitively called, 
not just modern persons, but “The Moderns,” are persons for whom 
being modern is somehow an issue, in something of the same way as 
an existential philosopher defines the human as that form of being for 
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whom being is in question. So the Moderns are not not-modern in any 
common-or-garden way of being not modern, the way characteristic 
of people (and nonpeople) to whom it has never occurred to think 
of themselves as modern. Rather, they are not-modern in a fractiously 
reflexive way that involves them assuming that they are in fact modern, 
when they are not. So, for Latour, only moderns whose modernity is 
qualified in this way in fact qualify as any kind of Modern at all. It is 
a kind of set-theoretical hokey-cokey, in which, by setting foot in the 
category of the modern, you step outside it, only to find yourself at 
that very moment back inside it. This is all made even more exquisite 
by the fact that what it means to take yourself to be modern is precisely 
a set of negations in the first place, since to be modern is to be in the 
condition evoked in Yeats’s “Sailing to Byzantium”: “Once out of nature 
I shall never take / My bodily form from any natural thing.” If to be 
modern is to be not-natural, to count as one of Latour’s Moderns one 
must be not not-natural.
For Latour, the most important feature of a move beyond critique, 
or, if one wanted to avoid a preposition with which critique itself is so 
besotted, away from critique, in some other direction, is that it thereby 
becomes more able to accommodate and transact with objects. Critique, 
by contrast, carves objects away and carves the wielders of critique away 
from objects. Whatever might replace critique, by contrast, conveys 
us “not away but toward the gathering, the Thing.”6 Subtraction and 
abstraction thereby give way to accumulation and attraction: “Can we 
devise another powerful descriptive tool that deals this time with mat-
ters of concern and whose import then will no longer be to debunk 
but to protect and to care, as Donna Haraway would put it? Is it really 
possible to transform the critical urge in the ethos of someone who 
adds reality to matters of fact and not subtract reality?”7 Objects are 
etymologically what are thrown up against subjects, resisting or at least 
deflecting their equanimity. Relishing the opportunity it gives him to 
rebut the accusation that his work has tended to dissolve objects and 
the facts that represent them into social constructions, Latour argues 
that the remission or renunciation of critique is in fact in the interest 
of a renewed attention to objects, and so seems to call for the removal 
of the queasy quotation marks that seem to shimmer around words 
like “fact,” “object,” and “world.” He has asked for a social science that 
might be described, not as worldly, where that word might imply a weary, 
jaded cynicism, but “earthly,” meaning willing to concern itself with the 
nature of our embodied life on this planet: “While we might have had 
social sciences for modernizing and emancipating humans, we have not 
the faintest idea of what sort of social science is needed for Earthlings 
buried in the task of explicitating their newly discovered attachments.”8
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We may usefully wonder why object-orientation might be taken to be 
an invigoration for the humanities as for the social sciences with which 
Latour mostly concerns himself. One pressing reason would indeed be 
that the relation to objects precisely supplies the distinction that keeps 
the idea of “the humanities” in place and in one piece. From the outside, 
it appears that those in the humanities have objects of study in much 
the same way as other fields. Historians study the past, literary critics 
study things called literary texts (it doesn’t matter that for some time 
we have had no idea what these are, because we can study the issue of 
our not-knowing), musicologists study music, and so, apparently, on. 
This looks isomorphic with the ways in which geographers study lakes 
and traffic systems, linguists study the workings of language, astrono-
mers study celestial objects, biologists study living organisms (whatever 
that is meant to mean), and physicists study the nature of the matter 
whose various ways of being arranged go to make up the objects of all 
the other subjects. 
In fact, though, the humanities are not so much absorbed in their 
apparent objects as absorbed in the nature of their absorption in them. 
Indeed, increasingly, the object of the humanities has been the condi-
tion and possibilities of the humanities themselves. My home subject, 
English literature, has been converted into a factory for the detection 
and denunciation of various kinds of social sin, and the affirmation of 
various kinds of social good. Students increasingly arrive in universi-
ties already knowing that the most important thing about literature is 
how far it conduces to the work of human emancipation from various 
kinds of unquestionable wrong. This means that the study of literature 
becomes self-explicating and self-promoting. We study literature, not 
because of an interest in what kind of thing literary texts might be 
or do, not so much for what literature may show or tell us about our 
condition, and certainly not for the sake of pleasure, but in order to 
demonstrate the value of developing the powers that studying literature 
is thought to give. The little objects represented by the individual texts 
that come under scrutiny are all really surrogates for the Big Object that 
is literature itself, or rather, literary texts as instructed and inflected by 
literary-critical analysis. Every reading is really an allegory of this kind 
of reading: it is an arena for the exhibition and performance of what 
literature, subject to the right kind of literary-critical attention, can do. 
This seems to apply across the humanities. Every now and again critical 
theory in the humanities is given a shot in the arm by the discovery of 
another kind of wrong (preferably an irremediable one) to denounce, 
such as, in recent times, the depredation of the earth. But the real 
question at issue in the humanities is always “what are the powers and 
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responsibilities of the humanities?” Almost always, it seems, the answer 
to that question is that the humanities are sovereign but neglected or 
marginalized, the unacknowledged legislators. The humanities are anti-
elitist, but are founded upon a kind of democracy of ressentiment that 
allows everybody the fantasy of aristocratic distinction that comes from 
the exercise of critique.
The humanities have succeeded very well in defining themselves as a 
form of attention that is itself the answer to every problem that may be 
encountered. Vastly overvaluing their name, the humanities see them-
selves immodestly and incredibly as the custodians of the value of the 
human itself, which, so the theory goes, has always and everywhere to be 
rescued and redeemed from the alleged inhumanity of every object of 
critique, from capitalism to climate change. Throbbing behind this is a 
raw kind of vitalism: in defending the value of the human against other 
more technical or mechanical kinds of proceeding, the humanities iden-
tify themselves as the high priests of life making a stand against death. 
Maybe I am really describing here, not the humanities in general, 
but English in particular. It is certainly the case that English has often 
acted on the assumption that it is at once the supreme form and the 
most representative form of the humanities as such. If I am being pa-
rochial here, my defense is that this is another defining feature of the 
humanities, namely the willingness of particular subjects to depend on 
this kind of synecdoche. In my experience, scientists, who may consent 
to be drawn politely and intelligently into discussion of the nature of 
scientific inquiry over a pint or a paella, do not spend their time won-
dering how or whether what they are doing does or does not constitute 
science, or actively embodies the spirit, value, or destiny of Science as 
such. But the only way to work in the humanities is to be continuously 
attuned to the question of what the humanities do and are. Everything 
done in the humanities bears on “the humanities.” The circuit-diagram 
of the sciences, we might say, presents a complex and distributed picture. 
In the humanities, by contrast, every circuit seems to come straight off 
the fusebox, with the result that every overload or crossed wire seems 
to jeopardize the whole system. I think the disciplines known as “the 
humanities” could usefully learn to give up this obsessive self-reference, 
along with the pressure to autotrophic allegory, according to which every 
enterprise is justified as a proof or affirmation of what “art,” “literature,” 
“emotion,” or any of the surrogates for the humanities themselves, can do.
Latour aims to make it possible for the humanities and social sciences 
to take more responsible account of earthly objects—of rivers and birds, 
of climate change, environmental damage, and species destruction. The 
most important thing here is to unlearn what it is to be modern, or 
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rather to recognize that we can never have been the kind of moderns 
that we had taken ourselves to be, that is, creatures exiled in an empire 
of discourse and culture that means we must remain at a fascinating, but 
tragic distance from the natural existence that is no longer possible for 
us. Instead, Latour would have us learn to recognize that “Cultures—dif-
ferent or universal—do not exist, any more than Nature does. There are 
only natures-cultures.”9 Ultimately, the project of showing that modern 
humans can never have been nonnatural is intended to ensure that we 
rapidly understand that what we do has consequences for nature, and 
therefore for us. We may thus be freed from the illusion of our freedom 
from nature and recognize, in Serres’s frequently repeated formula, that 
“we depend on what depends on us.”
The project of opening up awareness of ecological issues runs in paral-
lel with a rather different sense in which modernization might give way 
to ecology. This concerns not the object of the humanities and social 
sciences, but rather their own form, or mode of organization. In An In-
quiry Into Modes of Existence, Latour proposes a work of redescription that 
may allow us “to give more space to other values that are very commonly 
encountered but that did not necessarily find a very comfortable slot 
for themselves within the framework offered by modernity: for example, 
politics, or religion, or law, values that the defense of Science in all its 
majesty had trampled along its way but which can now be deployed more 
readily. If it is a question of ecologizing and no longer of modernizing, it 
may become possible to bring a larger number of values into cohabitation 
within a somewhat richer ecosystem.”10 If we can all agree that such a 
proposal has a soothing sound, we should allow ourselves to wonder why. 
Perhaps it is because it seems so Hippocratic, adhering to the physician’s 
principle of primum non nocere, “first do no harm.” Ecologizing means 
including, comprehending, accepting, tolerating rather than deciding. 
We might well say that deciding in the sense of cutting off (de+caedere), 
has become deciduous (de+cadere), and therefore cyclical. 
And yet, of course, Latour’s language has become, if anything, even 
more urgently martial, more militantly decisive than ever before. In War 
of the Worlds, we read that “the West has to admit to the existence of 
war in order to make peace.”11 But this making of peace has a greater 
dimension. We need to stop making war in order to wage it, in order to 
be able to take arms against the unwitting war that, according to James 
Lovelock as summarized by Latour, we are waging against the world: “He 
is not talking about one of those antiquated wars that so many humans 
wage against one another, but of another war, the one that humans, as 
a whole, wage, without any explicit declaration, against Gaia.”12 This war 
cannot be won, for “either we come out on top of Gaia, and we disap-
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pear with her; or we lose against Gaia, and she manages to shudder us 
out of existence. Now that’s ‘terror’ for real.”13
In this bellicose conception of our new relation to nature, Latour fol-
lows his conservative master, Serres, even to the point of borrowing his 
metaphor in La Guerre mondiale, of a war against the world: “The reader 
must forgive my audacity in changing the meaning of the expression: 
World War. Instead of giving to it the signification it has in the two con-
flicts which involved a majority of people, or nations, I speak here of a 
war that sets the whole world (tout le monde) against the World.”14 But 
this mobilization is different from other mobilizations, which were always 
temporary. Populations were enjoined with an encore un effort, to gather 
their energies and resources together to pit them against an enemy that 
threatened their very existence. Always, there was the prospect of victory. 
The instant jettisoning of Churchill, the war leader, by the postwar Brit-
ish electorate seemed to be the proof that British people had come to 
think of the war as being fought to bring into being a different world, 
without or beyond the state of conflict. But the effort that the world is 
currently being enjoined to make is different, for, like the communist 
revolutions, this mobilization must be permanent. Jacques Derrida has 
called language “a machine for undoing urgency.”15 But we will need 
to ensure that the problem of climate change remains something with 
which we can never permit ourselves to be bored. Perhaps indeed, main-
taining the level of interested stress might be the most important thing 
the humanities can do in relation to the question of climate change.
The War on Terror is insistently twinned with, by being opposed to, 
the World War, the war to end the War-Against-the-World. Latour lost no 
time in condemning the fuss made in response to the Paris attacks on 
November 13 as trivial compared with the real threat to civilization that 
would be debated at the World Climate Summit in Paris. For Latour, “this 
kind of thuggery is a law-and-order matter, not war, despite all the flag-
waving and calls to arms.”16 Having distinguished terrorism and climate 
change, Latour immediately reassociated them, on the grounds that both 
of them involve nihilistic suicide: “Just like those who kill themselves in 
the act of killing, people in positions of responsibility who fail to take on 
the issue of global climate change with the greatest seriousness is [sic] 
shouting in unison with the terrorists: Long live death!”17 
The rhyme between “earthly science,” or a humanities attuned to 
questions relating to ecology, and this ecology of interconnected, rather 
than hierarchically divided, forms of life seems compelling and natural. 
But there is also something strange about it. This strangeness consists in 
the suggestion that an intellectual culture that has an ecological form 
will be more capable of generating and sustaining ecological content 
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and having ecological effects. Modernization put us at a fatal distance 
from nature, reducing it to the demeaned and disenchanted condition 
of object. Surely then, so the concealed logic goes, anything that disal-
lows that distance will make it impossible for us to continue with our 
work of environmental despoliation? An enriched ecology of intellectual 
practices, of the kind that Latour projects in An Inquiry Into Modes of 
Existence, is taken to be ecological in its effects. Latour’s work since the 
early 1990s has been conducted on two fronts that he believes ultimately 
converge, namely social epistemology and ecology. This is a magical 
operation that partakes of a defining fantasy of self-definition. We have 
somehow to transcend transcendence, since the willingness or desire to 
attain the high ground, or even to slip the surly bonds of earth altogether, 
is precisely what has left us up to our necks in the mire. Latour thinks, 
or writes as if he thinks, that we need a drastic change of philosophy. 
Though we might remind ourselves again that Latour’s primary affilia-
tion and addressee is not the humanities but the social sciences, this is 
a familiar role for what calls itself the humanities, one that science and 
technology, for all its juggernaut-like power, tends meekly to acknowledge 
whenever it agrees to enlist an ethics expert on its advisory board. But 
a change of heart or mind need make no difference at all. A difference 
to our chances of survival will be whatever results in a dramatic decrease 
in carbon emissions. That’s it. Don’t follow the objects or the actants, 
follow the numbers, for they are what will kill or cure us. 
This move, of mistaking epistemology for effect, is one of the most 
common of the dream-machines of the humanities. But the problem 
is not one of how we understand what we are; it is a problem of what 
we decide to do, or do without deciding. It is a technical and not an 
epistemological question. It is not a question of how we come to feel 
about our being-in-the-world; it is a question of what kind of being in 
the world we manage to bring about or retain. Even “The Question 
Concerning Technology” is most impelling and urgent as a technical 
and not a philosophical question. Climate change is a technical problem. 
Changing how we think about our place in the world might do some 
good, but only if it helps with the job of engineering.
It is not that the human should be entirely evacuated from the humani-
ties. Indeed, it is just the opposite. The problem of human involvement in 
nature will need to become ever more prominent and unignorable. But 
taking account of the human—of human entanglements and effects—is 
different from referring every question to “the human.” The question 
of whether and how humans are to survive and prosper, if they/we are, 
can be usefully decoupled from the question of what “the human” might 
be, and what “the humanities” might take as their mission. 
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The way to make yourself important and necessary is to define a prob-
lem in such a way that only your involvement or intercession will solve 
it. Thus, science and engineering can be made to seem like the source 
of a problem that only the balm of letting-be can mitigate. One can see 
something similar in the ways in which the problem of the fantasy-object 
known as “capitalism” is construed in the humanities. Much political 
thinking is motivated by the effort to anthropomorphize capitalism—
and one can tell this is going on whenever capitalism is referred to as 
“capital.” This discursive move allows one to imagine capitalism as an 
ideology or even an intentional and self-willing subject rather than a set 
of structures and conditions. That is, it allows one to think in terms of 
what capitalism wants and what it does in the furtherance of its wants. 
The psycho-epistemological payoff for this projection of intentionality 
is immense. For now one is faced not with the problem of a set of com-
plex conditions that need to be understood and reconstructed without 
worsening the problem, but with the problem of a will, indomitable or 
insidious as it may be. And all that is then required to resist or, who 
knows, even to defeat capitalism, is to want something different from it, 
opposing your will to its. But if capital were not thought to want things 
any more than the Ebola virus or a tropical cyclone, one might have to 
set to the task of understanding and reconstructing mechanisms rather 
than reforming persons or forcing them into compliance. No wonder the 
humanities are so convinced that persons are much more complicated 
than machines, even though everything they say about them in the sto-
rybooks and nursery rhymes they love so much proclaims the opposite. 
One reforms the problem in fantasy in order to make it susceptible to 
fantasy solutions.
It looks as though our survival may depend upon an act of engineering 
greater and more extensive than any ever before undertaken, one that 
encompasses all aspects of social, political, economic, and psychological 
life. Whether we seek to slow or reverse climate change (wind turbines, 
solar panels, carbon capture), or simply to adapt to it (flood defenses), 
our response is going in one way or another to have to be engineered. 
If things go well, the thing called the humanities may negotiate some 
kind of role in the work of stressory maintenance and affect management 
that may enable us, at the very least, to stay focused on a problem that 
is going to go away only if we are even more completely wrong about 
things than we have ever been. The greenhouse effect will be answered 
only by some heightening of the kind of “greenhouse-effect” that Peter 
Sloterdijk has identified as the work of culture, the creation of artifi-
cially maintained spheres of security and well-being to protect against 
“the cosmic frost infiltrating the human sphere” and the “shellessness 
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in space” that ensued upon the Enlightenment banishment of divine 
providence from nature.18 We will all of us need to understand that we 
are involved in engineering instead of emancipation.
The measure of failure and success will not be: have we at last under-
stood the truth of our embeddedness in the world? It will be: have we 
helped decrease or increase carbon emissions? We are going for some 
time yet to have to live by numbers, watching the emission levels going 
up more or less quickly as one watches the taxi meter. What Latour of-
fers is a kind of allegorical letting be: a project in which the humanities 
become the shepherds of social being, carefully conserving rather than 
brutally massacring “modes of existence.” This is a pseudo-ecological 
exercise, one that is isomorphic with ecological thinking and action, 
without in fact being it. 
Latour is right to want to sustain a diversity of styles of thought 
and forms of life. But it would be wrong to think of the humanities 
as naturally equipped to provide this diversity (not that anyone could 
accuse Latour of thinking this). It is often supposed that the pursuit 
of scientific or technical subjects of concern has tended to produce a 
grimly technicist monoculture, which it is the job of the humanities to 
diversify. But monomania is a general problem for human beings, not 
just for scientifically minded ones, and humanists can be just as one-
eyed and obsessive as scientists. We need engineering and mathematics 
to rescue us from religious or poetic obsessiveness just as often as we 
need our medical students to be “humanized” by taking courses in the 
European novel. 
The humanities routinely offer a dramatization and a glamorization 
of minority, an exiled marginality magnified into the condition humaine. 
“The humanities” often seem to mean just the same thing as “the Celts,” 
which began its long and ludicrous career as a word meaning “not us,” 
or “those over there.” But as the proliferation of Burns suppers and St. 
Patrick’s Day Parades all over the world attests, who does not want to be 
part of “the Celtic fringe”? Similarly, the humanities make a cult of self-
Celtification. Everyone wants to be a Celt, where a Celt means someone 
on the fringe, someone driven out from the centers of power. We aspire 
to wear, as a badge of pride, the epigraph that Matthew Arnold took from 
Macpherson’s Ossian for his lectures on Celtic literature: “They always 
went to battle and they always fell.” (The much-reproduced Wikipedia 
page remarks of the word “keltoi,” with an immaculate piece of petitio 
principii, that “several authors have supposed it to be Celtic in origin.” 
But the question of who these Celts were and what the inside defini-
tion of being “Celtic” might be, is exactly what is in question when one 
investigates the use of the word.) 
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The humanities will become significant only when they really accept 
their marginality, rather than bloating it into a folie de grandeur. There may 
indeed be a public relations role for the humanities, in softening people 
up, or toughening them up, for the kind of world it looks as though we 
will need to bring about or put up with. One thing is certain, that the 
prodigious growth in the humanities (we are not supposed to notice 
this, since the humanities can only exist in a condition of defensive and 
resentful outrage at being cut) was sustained by a hydrocarbon-fueled 
high-growth economy that may have gone forever, or, if it has not gone, 
may henceforth have to be held at bay. The humanities have not shown 
much appetite for the kind of austerity that might have to go along 
with the low-growth economy forming part of a sustainable world. The 
humanities will become useful at the point at which they learn to be 
useful occasionally and in part, rather than existing contemptuously and 
uselessly apart. They may learn to take part in the composition of a new 
phase of human life, a negotiated rather than a martial Anthropocene, 
if they learn to give up their immodest excitability in favor of a kind of 
modest composure. 
When asked in an interview what he thought the future of the hu-
manities might be, Serres paused for a moment, then replied, simply, 
“Death.”19 But there might be a more hopeful way of seeing this imminent 
demise, a way presaged by the sly Brechtian adage “where there’s death, 
there’s hope.” To be sure, there may be a cost. The humanities may get 
to join the epistemological party only at the cost of the principle that 
has sustained them. In other words, the vauntingly impotent humani-
ties may earn a slice of power if they give up a large measure of their 
presumptuous dominion over the realm of “the human.” A new name, 
or a discrediting of the old one, would really help a lot. Can there ever 
have been a more absurd claim than that the vast and proliferating 
range of things undertaken by humans—all forms of industrial produc-
tion, economic activity, scientific research, technical development, and 
mathematical speculation—are somehow more incidental to being hu-
man than listening to music or reading stories? What kind of insanity 
is it to imagine that mathematics is not part of the humanities? Given 
the conspicuous absence of mathematical capacity or curiosity among 
badgers and bacteria, it would seem that nothing could be more es-
sentially human than mathematics, along with everything that it makes 
sense of and makes possible. Yet those who affiliate themselves with “the 
humanities” persist in equating numbers with death and the inhuman. 
Latour has found more important things with which to occupy himself 
than the nature or future of the humanities. This is precisely the reason 
why his work might be salutary for them. The most important thing 
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that the humanities need to have said to them is “this is not about you.” 
Latour’s work allows us to wrench the question “what future is there 
for the humanities?” into the question “what future is there but the hu-
manities?”— meaning by this that the many different ways in which the 
engineering of the human, and the regulation of the relations between 
the human and natural worlds, must proliferate. If the humanities can 
give up their perfervid fantasy that they are the custodians of the hu-
man, they may have something useful to contribute. 
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